Millpool West Bromwich#2 The Meltdown of W H Keys

 

This second of four part posts dealing with the pollution issues at Millpool in West Bromwich is mainly technical and outlines the chemicals and regulation of the failed W H Keys Company and its incompetent directors and staff.

Already prior to the 2000’s I have evidenced how this company was polluting the Hobnail Brook and the wider area and affecting aquatic birds at Millpool with their “bitumen based” chemicals and how the way in which this was dealt with by the authorities was not very thorough to say the least.

I asked the EA via an FOI request for information regards the pollution issues arising from this factory and associated water pollution. The reply to this 2008 request is shown below.

This evidence will be set out below.

Prior to 2000, a couple of fires were noted on the site, and were a mentioned threat to offsite sources. Obviously at this stage the previous Hobnail Brook pollution would still have been on the radar of the NRA officers.

The first incident occurred on 28/4/1994 and was a visit connected to a bitumen burner fire where foam was used to extinguish the flammable material. West Midlands Fire Service had alerted their colleagues.

No pollution was noted, although the existing ground contamination is not mentioned or how the residues of this fire would have affected the surroundings. It is noted that although the name of the managing director is redacted by the EA in the request, there are clearly two g’s in the surname. 😉 😉

A further fire on 25/2/1999 occurred in possibly the same unit, and again WMFS were involved.

What we see here is the useless “owner” of the site believing there is a “soakaway” drainage- i.e into contaminating the ground and then groundwater, but WMFS believed there to be foul water severe connections. The mention of “unbranded solvents” on the site is another example of how badly this place was being run by those in charge.

Important regulation changes but still inadequate events would occur on a national basis in the mid 1990’s. The NRA became the Environment Agency in 1997.

In order to regulate and upgrade the use of dangerous substances in industry, the UK Government enacted the Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1999 and the Amendment Regulations 2005, commonly referred to as COMAH. These regulations amended the Planning (Hazardous Substances) Regulations 1992.

COMAH regulations and related guidance supposedly aims to prevent major accidents involving dangerous substances and to limit the consequences to people and the environment of any that do occur. This includes:

• Identifying installations that store or use a threshold amount of hazardous substances (Lower tier and Top tier)
• Providing guidelines on the prevention of accidents through the control of substances (Major Accident Prevention Plans, Safety reports)
• Providing guidance on mitigating the effects of hazards, including the effect on the environment and neighbouring sites, through the development of emergency plans.

The W H Keys site was affected by this legislation, and as part of the FOI request I submitted to the agency, they revealed documents concerning the classification of chemicals held on the site that fell within the COMAH framework. The site was classified as a Lower Tier site- even though several substances on the site, and those that had polluted the ground and beyond were deadly to human health and the aquatic environment!

Again, I will explore and comment on the documents in chronological order.

The letter from The Environment Agency to Keys dated 10/3/2004 refers to an officer site visit to the factory and explains the reasons for COMAH. I’m not sure how 50 tonnes makes it “toxic” when minute quantities of “dangerous substances” are obviously lethal! The EA are the “competent authority” in dealing with this site, though I would add that by my experience this is far from their actual position in practice!

 

Another letter refers to one from Keys, which the EA did not give me in the FOI request. It confirms that Keys had accepted that they fell within the threshold of the legislation. It also refers to “improvement notices” which I will look at further on.

 

COMAH CHEMICALS

There appear to have been three listed chemicals falling within the framework and over the 50 tonne limit. An inspection report explains the position, and I have scanned this for confirmation below. The interaction and use of these chemicals will be explained further on in this post when a near catastrophic incident occurred at the site.

Click for full data sheet information. NB All of these substances state that full PPE should be worn when handling, breathing apparatus worn when it is involved in fires, and that medical attention should be obtained when exposed. Not much chance of that when you don’t know what it is is when it gets off site is there? 

orthocresolphenolmix SDS

This “marine pollutant” substance is a mixture of Ortho-cresol and phenol and is a dark brown liquid. It is described as “toxic” to skin contact causing burns and also to aquatic systems. Notably it states that fires should not be fought using water jets. It states “Prevent contamination of soil and water.” and also that it may form “explosive mixtures with air.”

When molten, it states “Prevent from spreading or entering drains, ditches or rivers by using sand, earth or other appropriate barriers. “ It also states that it may solidify and block drains.

Health wise it damages the liver and kidneys with repeat exposure, kills “tadpoles” in yer stick and also forms tumours in experimental animals. 

In the case of this company therefore, they clearly were unable to do this prior to the regulations coming into effect. One wonders how much had solidified in the soil, and was just waiting to be released again to groundwater when made molten? 

I will particularly note the information below which is important to the environmental fate of this insoluble chemical and any attempts later to try and identify unknown dark brown liquid pollution in the Hobnail Brook and the Milky.

 

cresylic acid SDS

This yellowish liquid is another mixture of cresols and phenol. Once again it is “toxic” and damaging to aquatic organisms.

When burnt it gives of toxic fumes of carbon dioxide and carbon monoxide.

The same warnings concerning risks to drains and water courses are given as the chemical above.

 

LIGHTS SDS

This corrosive yellow liquid chemical is a mixed low boiling point chlorocresol and is “toxic by inhalation and causes sever burns.”

“Do not let product enter drains, Do not allow product to contaminate groundwater system. “

Unfortunately it is once again quick to disappear in water traceability.

Keys supplied the regulation 6 form to the EA on 15/6/2004 to a man called Eaton within The Health and Safety Executive, and I have scanned this in the PDF below.

WHKEYSCOMAH

There is so little information contained in this form as for it to be utterly useless and unfit for purpose. The most information can be read below where it states that “toxic liquids” are stored within the range 50-200 tonnes.

The worst part of this is the liar stating that there are no water courses that may be affected by the operations. Not only was this well known to Keys that water courses HAD been affected by their operations, but also to their regulators as well. The caveat of drinking water is a disgrace given that the River Tame is open and accessible to members of the public and is fed by The Hobnail Brook.

Unfortunately, the (in)competent authority only appear interested in a box ticking exercise and paper shuffling. Notification that it would be put on the public register was later received as per the letter below.

 

The next EA document they provided me with concerns a list of improvement notices they had issued following an inspection of the site. Unfortunately, they did not provide me with the inspection report mentioned in connection with this. What is interesting is the mention of releasing “white spirit vapour” from this site, as well as the Xylene based product. 

EA KEYS IMPROVEMENT AUG2004

The love of the acronym is another observation of these bureaucratic civil service entities. If only they actually meant anything substantial in practice compared to the theory that originated them. Here, we are introduced to MATTES, (Major Accidents to The Environment) and MAPPS (Major Accident Prevention Policy).

The EA wrote to Keys on 5/11/2004 requesting the MAPP for COMAH- you can see how these phrases just reduce the substance of safety to ridiculous proportions. Environmental matters were what the EA were interested in.

Keys duly sent this off with a letter dated 16/12/2004. I have scanned the full PDF below and it only amounts to 10 pages.

WHKEYS MAPP POLICY NOVEMBER 2004

This is another theoretical exercise, and yet there is no specific mention of previous incidents of pollution to the Hobnail Brook or Millpool.

It does outline the roles of The Managing director, works chemist and works manager, and perhaps the closest we get to admission of past incidents is on page 7.

On 21st December 2004 the EA performed a pre Christmas COMAH inspection.

WHKEYS COMAH INSPECTION 21DEC2004

The report of 4 pages observes some interesting practices which appear to suggest that health and safety at this site was something for the cameras and for the new regulations, rather than something that was ingrained within the managing director of this site instructing staff as to how they should operate. Note the fact that managers were not wearing breathing apparatus- and in connection with this, please refer to the safety data sheets I have already scanned where it is strongly advised to do so in the three chemicals with which they were obliged to register as a Lower Tier site.

It is of concern to me that the inspector was “unfamiliar” with the site during the guided inspection. Perhaps an unannounced visit may have revealed far more of interest? It is also noted that the ground within the works was “soft” suggesting an easier pathway into soils and drains given it is classed as a “increased risk”. 

The past history of Keys is briefly outlined and the chemicals handled mentioned. I note that Sandwell Council are mentioned as allowing them “releases of solvent”? The hot and cold bitumen statement I find troubling, as it appears that this company have a caveat which is not entirely clear was being enforced by anyone knowledgeable or familiar about the site.

The HSE appear to have told Keys they were to be monitored under the new regulations rather than anyone from the company proactively understanding the new legislation. This again suggests a poor knowledge base from the managing director down. It is also noted that the MAPP report as scanned above has only recently been written, suggesting little in the way of previous health and safety policy with regards for operations at this site. One can see from the historic pictures that this site was a barrel waste graveyard which had bled into the soil and groundwater contaminating all around it.

The following I find unbelievable, and one wonders how they can be regarded as a credible handler of 100 plus tonnes of toxic materials that could cause significant environmental damage and loss of life to an unsuspecting populace of West Bromwich- including two nearby schools! I have marked these as the EA should have-

So in summary Keys had

• NO ACCIDENT REPORTING SYSTEM , EMPLOYEES ARE ONLY “ENCOURAGED” TO REPORT SPILLS, OR NEAR MISSES FOR THE ENVIRONMENT!
• IF ANYTHING HAPPENED ON SITE, THEY WOULD BASICALLY FUCK OFF AND RING THE FIRE BRIGADE!
• “THERE IS NO SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTAL TRAINING”!!!
• NO FORMAL IN HOUSE MAINTENANCE SYSTEM FOR STORAGE TANKS OR VESSELS HOUSING MANY TONNES OF TOXIC AND DANGEROUS CHEMICALS.

On the last point, we will see how this unravelled in just a very short time later!

THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL POINT IS MADE BELOW, AND ONE WHICH I WILL REPEAT AND MENTION EVERY TIME THAT ANYONE CLAIMS THAT NO POLLUTION CAME FROM THIS SITE- PARTICULARLY WHEN IT WAS GOING TO BE “CLEANED UP”.

 

“ALL STORM WATER , SPILLS ETC FLOW TO GROUND AND HAVE BEEN DOING SO FOR A CENTURY. THERE IS A GREAT DEAL OF CONTAMINATED LAND, WITH MANY OLD DRUMS STORED ON BARE EARTH”

Rather than fining them for this or prosecuting any regulations, it appears the EA are content to allow this to continue. I have seen the same thing with Rattlechain and it appears how toothless this quango is when deferring to things of the past continuing. We have seen how this shoddy and incompetent management system polluted controlled waters, and yet nothing changed from the days of the National Rivers Authority.

But it just gets better.

• THE REGULATORS ARE AWARE THAT “A FIRE IS A LIKELY SCENARIO” AND WOULD LEAD TO “EXTENSIVE CONTAMINATION OF LAND”
• THERE IS NO CONTAINMENT FOR FIRE WATER. “ALL FIRE WATER WILL PASS TO GROUND” THEREFORE THIS POINTS TO IT PASSING TOWARDS THE DOWN GRADIENT AND DOWN STREAM HOBNAIL BROOK.
• THE SITE WAS CONTAMINATED ALREADY BUT SPILLS WOULD “PASS TO GROUND”.
• THE SITE IS ON A HILL- SO DO YOU NOT DRAW ANY CONLCUSIONS AS TO WHERE IT WOULD RUN TO ONCE “PASSING TO GROUND”? 

In conclusion the EA accept that a source-pathway-receptor plausible pollution model exists, but do not state that this had already happened, and well within the knowledge of those running this abysmal fucking factory! IT IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO ME THAT THE EA FAILED TO IDENTIFY THE RISKS TO THE HOBNAIL BROOK AND MILLPOOL, WHICH IS NOT EVEN CONSIDERED BY THE INDIVIDUAL “UNFAMILIAR” WITH THE SITE. 

Perhaps not surprisingly, the EA issued the company with an improvement notice, how could they be much worse?) in the new year.

EA IMPROVEMENT NOTICE TO KEYS 7 JAN 2005

There is not much to say here, as it is mostly the legal standing that operates rather than the detail needed as to where this company was failing. This is all we actually get, which means they had little to bite them with if they failed to act within the generous time given them to do so.

Perhaps if COMAH had any teeth and fined companies by the week when they failed to act rather than give them months to act, or had the power to shut down the entire business from operating until compliance was reached then the EA might be a credible outfit. As they are, and as I have seen over many years, they are little more than prefects with a badge and do little to “make a better place” as their logo suggests.

The above statement does not address the contamination already in the ground spoken of, and so how can the EA therefore monitor “new” spillages when they would just be blamed on old ones from the last Century? It does depress me that this organisation appears to be a loophole jockey for things to continue as they were, because that is the way they always have been done, and it’s probably what Major Keys, the freemason, bunged people to look the other way and ignore his polluting business.

BITUMEN BLAME GAME

It was perhaps inevitable that this failing company would collapse very soon, but as the new year dawned, a visual metaphor occurred that sums up the scope of the case.

At the site, three large storage tanks labelled T1, T2 AND T3 were present, and yet KEYS themselves distanced ownership of these vessels which received tonnes of the dangerous liquids for which they were governed under COMAH regulations. The EA and the HSE were negligent in not closing down this bullshit or making enquiries about these storage tanks at the earliest stage. The safe containment of the chemicals on site- is it not, their responsibility? 

Another cruddy outfit based in Kent known as PMC Marketing Ltd were the said owners of these corroding old storage tanks. The tale from Keys about the ownership and use of these is outlined in the next EA inspection report shown below. PMC were basically the middleman seller of a product made at the works using the dangerous substances to which Keys were being monitored.

Keys wrote to PMC on 16/2/2005 giving their account of a “major incident”, or perhaps the negligence of the company involving the collapse of one of the tanks T2.

KEYS ACCOUNT OF T2 COLLAPSE

It is noted that from the start, Keys are quick to point the finger at PMC stating that it is owned by them and differentiating between “our” and “your”.

A delivery of 21.2 tonnes of Otho-cresol/phenol mixture was made and 17.15 tonnes were emptied into tank T2. This was a hot mixture of plus 40°C to keep it in a liquid state. To prevent crystallisation at 17°C, a dilutant needed to be added, this being mixed cresols (LIGHTS) which were already in the tank at 16,000 litres. 

Only after the OP1 had been added is it claimed that two operatives from Keys noticed that the tank had began to lean after a cracking noise was heard. Two of the four legs on this tank had broken leaving it leaning dangerously containing the highly toxic mixture.

The fire service were called and Keys started decanting the mixture between the road tanker and an adjacent tanker, ultimately emptying the leaning tower. What is not helpful is their attempt to switch units between tonnes and litres. I wonder if this was to cover up potential spills which they did not give an honest account of before reporting events?

The events of this near disaster are further explained in the subsequent EA inspection 3 days later on 18/2/2005. 

WH KEYS COMAH INSPECTION 18TH FEB 2005

“Depending upon the geology/hydrology, this release could have been  sufficient to cause a MATTE to groundwater and/or any controlled waters in continuity”- I.E HOBNAIL BROOK AND MILLPOOL. 

“COULD HAVE RESULTED IN FATALITIES.”

It is clear from the EA report that these tanks were not suitable for purpose and had been an issue and disaster waiting to happen. That they and the HSE and others before had not examined this is to their incompetence it has to be said as regulators! 

What is even more incredible is that PMC/KEYS and an outfit called “con-ren”- (I had to check that name as I thought it said “con-men” which would be a more suitable description of their work) thought that these tanks were suitable for use. Con- men had examined the tanks for PMC bizarrely very recently before this incident passing them off as safe. 😆

FOUR COMAH PROHIBITION NOTICES WERE SERVED

This prohibited use of tanks T1 and T2 and storage of these tanks, suspended manufacture of cresols blending, and prohibited storage of cresols in any other on site vessel.

The HSE also served notices on them as well.

The incredible event trail between PMC/KEYS AND CON-MEN is shown in communications held on file.

PMC had written to Keys on 20/12/2004, even referring to the imminent inspection the next day wishing them luck. 😆 The report states that the tanks were examined just 2 years earlier and the results being “very satisfactory”, Double 😆 😆

And so to the inevitable demise of this company which had obviously been coming for some time, though no thanks to the EA and HSE in allowing this fiasco to continue on. The last site visit took place on 6th May 2005. 

This had three Environment Agency Officers namely, Ian Kelsey– who had served the improvement notice which of course was an utter joke, a D Othen and N. Iles. The HSE were also present, though these are redacted in the report. Though it says that one of the EA officers had some familiarity with the site, obviously it wasn’t that much given the lack of knowledge concerning nearby water courses. 

WH KEYS COMAH VISIT 6TH MAY 2005

I will go through the whole report as it is of great relevance to subsequent events, and also one statement in this report which should shame those three EA officers which is patently and evidentially untrue.

The first important point to note is that the EA were told that Keys had gone into administration a month earlier.

It is revealed that BDO Stoy Hayward, blanked out , had taken over the administration of this company. This particular outfit appear quite often in the affairs of dubious companies at their apparent demise I have noted, almost acting as a fulcrum on the sea-saw between polluter and inevitable scummy housing developer sale.

It is quite apparent that this dodgy deal had been in the offing for some time, and maybe the “accident” was a deliberate act in bringing that about. What competent officer of this company would have been as fucking clueless as the managing director of this outfit was in health and safety law and compliance? As it is, this absolute thicko weapon had volunteered to remain at the company- why, when he was as useless as a morning after pill to a nun?

• MORE THAN 5O TONNES OF THE THREE COMAH REGISTERED CHEMICALS WERE STILL ON SITE IN VARIOUS STATES OF EXISTANCE. 
• SOME ACTIVITY, WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN STOPPED IN MY OPINION HAD CONTINUED UNDER BDO, WHO HAVE WHAT EXPERIENCE EXACTLY IN THE FIELD OF TOXIC CHEMICALS? 
• WHY DID THE HSE AGREE TO THIS? 
• DECONTAMINATION IS DESCRIBED AS “DIFFICULT”- WELL MAYBE NOT IF THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY IS UNAWARE OF LOCAL WATER COURSES THAT MAY BE FLUSHED WITH THESE CHEMICALS? 😉

 

• “THERE ARE ALSO AREAS WHERE SPILLAGES HAVE OCURRED AND THERE IS PROBABLE LAND CONTAMINATION.”
• “ALTHOUGH THERE ARE NO DRAINAGE SYSTEMS ON SITE , THERE ARE NO SENSITIVE RECEPTORS, EG RIVERS, CANALS ETC IN CLOSE PROXIMITY”

To mention this in a report these three EA officers show their utter incompetence, knowing fuck all about the site where they were supposed to be preventing from polluting the environment. They had clear records of such pollution from this site, their predecessors knowing full well the risks to The Hobnail Brook and Millpool, as did the twat managing director who had instigated clean up before.

What is clear from the description of the fiasco haphazard storage of chemicals, many unmarked and unseparated between flammable and toxic is how the EA and HSE are not credible authorities to manage COMAH. The EA report talks in future tense, whilst skipping the part where their regulation has totally failed to date, and is shown to be inept from how they describe the scene on site!

Why in this regard would they allow operations to continue? What a fucking joke.

 

An inventory of the chemicals alleged to be on site, not that the EA had validated this in their inspections is given. We learn of numerous tanks, some claimed to be empty, but not really “empty” because they were likely still contaminated with residual toxic chemicals.

The final curtain on this part of the story lies with the official demise of W H Keys and its liquidation confirmed in documents held by Companies House.

Before this date the chemicals on this site would be “removed” in a manner that I will be looking at in Part 3 of this story with disastrous environmental consequences.

As for the directors of this company it is a mystery as to who they actually were at the time of demise, as the records appear to show several named individuals resigning in the 1990’s! Just who was running W H Keys? We do know however that ALL of the below were calling the shots at this company when they were actively polluting the area with their chemical crap from the records the EA supplied me with, and they get NO anonymity from me.

Hear is the list of shame. What is even more disgraceful is that many of them live amongst us in the area in Sandwell, and would have seen the effects their disgusting failed company was having. Maybe their names should be up in “LIGHTS”.

Michael John GRAINGER

• Resigned: 2 November 1992

However listed as “MANAGING DIRECTOR”

• Appointed: 26 July 1991

Betty HAWKES 

• Resigned: 30 April 1998

• Marilyn HOBDAY

No record of resignation but 

• Appointed: 30 April 1998

and then again as

• Appointed: 5 October 2000

• Occupation: “Company Secretary”

Gillian Frances ALEXANDER

• Resigned: 21 July 1995

Henry Malcolm Thomas CURTEIS

• Resigned: 21 July 1995

Brian William KEYS-STATHAM 

• Resigned: 1 June 1992

David Graham KEYS-STATHAM

• Resigned: 21 July 1995                                                                                       

Cynthia Mary LEGGE

No record of resignation but 

• Appointed: 26 July 1991

Michael Keys MOULD

No record of resignation but 

• Appointed: 26 July 1991

• Occupation: “Retired Manager”

Sally Elizabeth Jane ROBERT 

• Resigned: 21 July 1995

John Rees ROBERTS

• Resigned: 21 July 1995

Janetta Faerie Ruby STATHAM 

• Resigned: 28 July 1994

Kim Stephen WARD

• Resigned: 5 July 1996