This request constitutes 7 separate requests for information, which due to not being allowed to “lie on file” have had to be asked subsequently.
Chemical fire at Rhodia UK Ltd January 2nd 2009
Request submitted 11th March 2010.
reply received 14th May 2010
Chemical fire at Rhodia UK Limited January 2nd 2009
Request submitted 2oth April 2011 .
reply received 6 May 2011
Chemical fire at Rhodia UK limited 2nd January 2009 (take 3)
Asked 19th April 2012
reply received 26th April 2012.
Chemical fire at Rhodia Uk Ltd (now ” a member of the Solvay group”) January 2nd 2009
Request submitted 2nd November 2012
Reply received 19th November 2012
Chemical fire at Rhodia UK Ltd, now known as Solvay January 2nd 2009
Request submitted 23rd November 2013
Reply received 27th November 2013
Chemical fire at Rhodia Uk Ltd (now ” a member of the Solvay group”) January 2nd 2009 6th attempt
Request submitted 7th October 2014
Reply received 9th October 2014
Rhodia fire(Solvay site) January 2nd 2009
Request submitted 28th April 2015
Reply received 29th April 2015
BACKGROUND
On 2nd January 2009, a major incident occurred at the Trinity Street Rhodia factory. The incident is highly relevant to Rattlechain lagoon as it appears to have involved the release of white phosphorus stored at the site and used in processes into the environment. Warnings were given by the police and the fire service that dealt with the fire concerning shutting windows and avoiding contact with water. Reports suggested that a white phosphorus leak had occurred in the phosphine plant, which resulted in a large plume of phosphorus pentoxide/white phosphorus vapour being released. Warnings about the chemical “reacting badly” with water indicate the potential for phosphoric acid to be produced, which would have caused acute problems concerning health. Two highways agency staff were reported to have sought medical attention and the incident closed local businesses. It received a great deal of attention in the press in the form of
LOCAL NEWS and more
TAKE 1
WHAT DID WE ASK?
As the lead authority in investigating industrial accidents and Health and Safety compliance we wanted to know what the HSE had found out in relation to this incident and also what information they held about other incidents at the site
“Could you please advise me if a final report concerning the chemical incident at the Trinity Street plant at Oldbury West Midlands on January 2009 allegedly involving White phosphorusis is available to access, or tell me when it is likely to be released,
or how I can obtain a copy. Can you also advise me of how many other incidentsthe HSE have investigated at this site over the years and their outcomes, and whether I can obtain this information from yourselves and any costs involved for this information.”
WHAT DID THEY KNOW?
After some confusion, and a request for an internal review, a response under the EIR regulations was received. This stated that the information regarding the report was not being made available as the investigation was still ongoing.
A rather dubious response was supplied concerning the time delay as part of the internal review, concerning a mix up of names. Read this here.
The EIR response also asked for clarification of which periods of time we were interested in regarding investigations at Trinity Street. We replied all held since before 2001 (as Albright and Wilson, and all after as Rhodia.)
The following response was received. THE REPLY CONFIRMED THAT HSE ONLY HELD INFORMATION FOR 10 YEARS- THERFORE ANY INCIDENTS IN THE ALBRIGHT AND WILSON ERA WERE NOT AVAILABLE.
Two past incidents were supplied BOTH FROM 2003 as Rhodia Consumer Specialities Ltd.
The reply stated again that two other investigations were still currently being investigated, the January 2009 fire which we knew about and another incident involving “the release of phosphorus oxychloride on 26th June 2007″ – both Rhodia UK LTD.
NB “Health Hazards : This poison is toxic by inhalation and ingestion and is strongly irritating to skin and tissues. It causes burns of the mucous membranes of the mouth and digestive tractand may be fatal. (EPA, 1998)”
And here’s a press report for the 2007 incident.
And here’s part of a paper written by Rhodia’s current contractors on the Rattlechain site ERM’s Glenn Pettitt and Rhodia’s Gurrinder Bains and none other than Tom Dutton from 2001. “Modelling of indoor release of water reactive toxic materials.” Obviously things didn’t go according to plan in the future 6 years after this was written.
As both investigations were still ongoing they would not release the information as it could compromise the investigation parameters if the information was made public.
We followed up this request in the following year, to see if the 2009 incident report had been completed and was available.
TAKE 2
WHAT DID WE ASK?
“In a previous request ref no 2010030298 I requested information concerning this incident which at the time of the reply 22nd March 2010, it was stated that The HSE were still investigating. I am now requesting whether this investigation has been completed or when it is likely to be completed? I am requesting the report into this incident if it has been completed.”
WHAT DID THEY KNOW?
The following response was received. This again stated that the report had not been completed and that release of information was being withheld as the investigation was still ongoing- now a full 2 years after it had happened. The HSE suggested that we submit another request for information in 6 months time.
TAKE 3
WHAT DID WE ASK?
“In a previous request ref no 2010030298 I requested information concerning this incident which at the time of the reply 22nd March 2010, it was stated that The HSE were still investigating. A further request for information 20110500 received on 6th May 2011
also stated that the HSE was still investigating.
I am now once again, over 3 years after this incident took place, requesting whether this investigation has been completed or when it is likely to be completed?
I am requesting the report into this incident if it has been completed.”
WHAT DID THEY KNOW?
Once again the HSE stated in a reply that the information was being refused as the investigation was still ongoing, and the report not complete- NOW MORE THAN 3 YEARS AFTER THE EVENT.
TAKE 4
WHAT DID WE ASK?
“In a previous request ref no 2010030298 I requested information concerning this incident which at the time of the reply 22nd March 2010, it was stated that The HSE were still investigating. A further request for information 20110500 received on 6th May 2011
also stated that the HSE was still investigating.
A third request for information was made relating to this incident ref 2012040462. Again it was stated that the HSE were still investigating. On each occasion the refusal to disclose the in formation was that the investigation was still ongoing which could prejudice the role of the HSE and that I should make a further request in six months time.
I am now once again, nearly 4 years after this incident took place, requesting whether this investigation has been completed or when it is likely to be completed and I am requesting a copy of this report which released white phosphorus and its toxic oxides into the local
environment.
This incident has not been forgotten even if the company concerned think that by changing name it has been.
I would additionally like to request a procedural overview or checklist that investigators in the HSE follow in such investigations, and at what stage in the process the investigators
of this incident are now at in following this procedure.”
WHAT DID THEY KNOW?
The following reply was received from the HSE which yet again now over 3 and a half years after the incident they claimed they were still investigating.
A link to the HSE investigation procedure was provided. Read this here.
To view a flow chart of the investigation procedure click here.
As stated in the response, the stage at time of asking this request was “step 4.6. i.e information is being considered ready for an enforcement decision to be made.”
TAKE 5
WHAT DID WE ASK?
“…..I am therefore requesting the outcome of the enforcement decision, the current stage at which the enforcement action is currently at, and if this has been completed, the report into this incident which released white phosphorus and its toxic oxides into the local
community. If not complete, I would appreciate the expected timescale for enforcement completion.”
WHAT DID THEY KNOW?
The following reply was received from the HSE which yet again now nearly 5 years after the incident they claimed they were still investigating! They have got any further forward with this investigation since the time of asking last year; i.e still at stage 4.6 “information is being considered ready for an enforcement decision to be made.”
TAKE 6
WHAT DID WE ASK?
“Following the fifth request I am therefore requesting the outcome of the enforcement decision, and whether you have made it yet, and what stage this is currently at. If complete I again request the report into this incident which released white phosphorus and its toxic oxides into the local community. If not complete, I would appreciate the expected timescale for enforcement completion.”
WHAT DID THEY KNOW?
The HSE replied.
“I can confirm that HSE’s investigation into the above incident is now complete and HSE are now following their enforcement procedures. HSE are unable to disclose the information you have requested until formal enforcement is concluded or the decision is taken not to proceed.
HSE suggest that you make further contact in three months time when further information may be available.”
Take 7
WHAT DID WE ASK?
“Can I therefore ask if you are proceeding with a prosecution against this company and if complete can I request the report into this incident?”
WHAT DID THEY KNOW?
The HSE replied.
“I can confirm that HSE’s investigation into the above incident is now complete and HSE are now following their enforcement procedures. HSE are unable to disclose the information you have requested until formal enforcement is concluded or the decision is taken not to proceed.
HSE suggest that you make further contact in three months time when further information may be available.”
Thus the letter was yet another indication that the HSE had still not followed any enforcement action over six years after the incident.
On 5th February 2016, it was revealed that the company now known as “Solvay Solutions Limited” had been fined nearly £500,000 for the incident. Thus it had taken the HSE 7 years to finally conclude the case.
WE COMMENT
Further requests were made to make this report available. The delay in completion of the HSE investigations appear to serve the interests of those being investigated. We will ensure it is not buried like the toxic waste at Rattlechain lagoon.