{"id":14563,"date":"2022-07-08T14:34:08","date_gmt":"2022-07-08T14:34:08","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/whatliesbeneathrattlechainlagoon.org.uk\/?page_id=14563"},"modified":"2022-07-08T14:34:08","modified_gmt":"2022-07-08T14:34:08","slug":"hs040","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/whatliesbeneathrattlechainlagoon.org.uk\/?page_id=14563","title":{"rendered":"HS\/040"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"toxic<\/a><\/p>\n

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HS\/040<\/strong><\/p>\n

OVERVIEW<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

This application was clandestinely hidden away on Sandwell Council’s website and eventually revealed to be<\/p>\n

\u201cModification to quantity of phosphine stored and used and proposed storage and use of Hexene, hydrogen peroxide and cyanex on site\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n

Solvay were seeking an increase in pressure for their use of the chemical they failed to control in 2009<\/a>– the toxic highly flammable gas\u00a0PHOSPHINE.<\/strong><\/p>\n

They were also seeking consent for new substances,\u00a0HEXENE, HYDROGEN PEROXIDE 35%, and CYANEX 923-<\/strong>\u00a0A mixture of the substances hexyldioctylphosphine oxide, dihexyloctylphosphine oxide, and trioctylphosphine oxide\u00a0. I will outline the risks associated with all of these substances below.<\/p>\n

The application form can be downloaded below.<\/p>\n

HS_040-APPLICATION_FOR_HAZARDOUS_SUBSTANCES_CONSENT-960495<\/a><\/p>\n

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PHOSPHINE<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n

Of all of the chemicals that this company could have applied for variation of, this one really does take the piss, and no wonder they do not want public scrutiny about it!<\/p>\n

This substance was originally permissioned by Hazardous substance consent\u00a0HS\/008\u00a0<\/a>in 1992.<\/p>\n

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This gave then Albright and Wilson consent quantity for 1,59 tonnes<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

Firstly let\u2019s look at the chemical hazard. Here is what the then Health Protection Agency (now Public Health England) saw about the risks of phosphine and incident management.<\/p>\n

Phosphine_properties_incident_management_toxicology<\/a><\/p>\n

One notes from this<\/p>\n

\u201cHealth effects of acute exposure<\/em><\/p>\n

\uf0b7 Phosphine is acutely toxic; exposure to high levels cause immediate effects \uf0b7 Early symptoms of acute phosphine or phosphide exposure are non-specific and include respiratory problems, cough, headaches, dizziness, numbness, general fatigue and gastrointestinal disturbance (pain, nausea, vomiting and diarrhoea) .\uf0b7 Effects of exposure to higher levels of phosphine, the onset of which may be delayed by several days or more, include pulmonary oedema, convulsions, damage to the kidney, liver and heart, and death \u2026\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n

The following safety data sheet was provided by Solvay- incidentally using the Rhodia brand\u00a0-who were responsible for the 2009 phosphine toxic uncontrolled release\u00a0occurring\u00a0\u00a0😆<\/p>\n

Just to be clear, there is no difference between the two companies, just the name.<\/p>\n

HS_040-SAFETY_DATA_SHEET_-_PHOSPHINE-960509<\/a><\/p>\n

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Oh dear, oh dear!<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

Rhodia\/solvay identify that phosphine is\u00a0\u201cvery toxic by inhalation\u201d<\/span><\/strong>,\u00a0\u201ccauses burns\u201d,\u00a0there is a\u00a0\u201d\u00a0risk of serious damage to eyes\u201d, \u201cinhalation may be fatal\u201d<\/span><\/strong>,\u00a0and it is\u00a0\u201cvery toxic to aquatic organisms\u201d<\/span><\/strong>.\u00a0\u00a0GOT THAT?<\/strong><\/p>\n

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This application was mired in semantics about what Solvay actually intended to do with this chemical- but they failed to answer if they were INCREASING the amount of phosphine or DECREASING the amount of phosphine on site- instead talking about increasing the pressure used-\u00a0which can only increase the risk. Even if they are decreasing the amount, does this hide the risk with the associated increase in pressure used?<\/strong><\/p>\n

The 2009 phosphine fire at this site\u00a0<\/a>laid bare the risks, the hazards and the failures of Rhodia- with the same HSE director\u00a0Tom Dutton<\/strong>\u00a0in control who makes this application for the rebranded \u201cSolvay\u201d . Incidentally at the time of the HS\/008 application in 1992, as an Albright and Wilson employee he was then listed as \u201crisk prevention manager\u201d. 😆<\/p>\n

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picture Express and Star<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

Here is the HSE outline of what happened that day and how it made international news when there was an uncontrolled release of\u00a037kg of phosphine and associated breakdown products.<\/p>\n

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As for Solvay\u2019s much heralded alarm system, they did not sound the alarm , as stated in the HSE investigation quite bloody laughably blaming this on West Midlands fire service\u00a0for the following reason.<\/p>\n

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Really?!<\/strong><\/p>\n

I will look a little more about this uncontrolled phosphine release\/fire and the atrocious failures in the summing up of this post.<\/p>\n

HEXENE<\/a><\/p>\n

This sought permission for\u00a027 tonnes\u00a0of this\u00a0highly flammable liquid substance.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The\u00a0 safety data sheet\u00a0 provided with the Solvay submission is 48 pages long and too large a file to download here, but here are the key points.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

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Just another flammable risk to local residents then.<\/p>\n

HYDROGEN PEROXIDE<\/a><\/p>\n

The following safety data sheet was submitted by Solvay with this application. They sought to use\u00a050 tonnes\u00a0of this material on site.<\/p>\n

HS_040-SAFETY_DATA_SHEET_-_HYDROGEN_PEROXIDE-960507<\/a><\/p>\n

Here are the key facts<\/p>\n

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Much as the chemical industry love to portray their hazardous substances in mundane terms to equate them with seeming innocuous everyday uses, the \u201chair dye\u201d is anything but safe on this site. Indeed, in today\u2019s terms it has been used of late by Isis inspired terrorists across Europe as a component in pressure cooker bombs. The risk is that it is an oxidiser and increase the risk of fire immensely. Given that this site deals with a whole host of already flammable and explosive substances does one feel that this inclusion of this particular chemical will increase or decrease the risk of explosion to the general public?<\/p>\n

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Oh well we can all go blonde as well as blind<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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CYANEX<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

This is another potential semantic tool used to describe three separate substances. The quantity applied for is also\u00a050 tonnes.\u00a0This is one of Solvay\u2019s own shit mixes as evidenced by\u00a0the following safety data sheet is submitted by Solvay in the application.<\/p>\n

HS_040-SAFETY_DATA_SHEET_-_CYANEX-960506<\/a><\/p>\n

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Lovely jubbly<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

And this one is also an embryo kiddy killer , as well as causing damage to virility gentlemen.<\/p>\n

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It is also worth pointing out some of the breakdown products of this mixture.<\/p>\n

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The three chemicals involved in the mixture are<\/p>\n

hexyldioctylphosphine oxide,<\/a><\/p>\n

dihexyloctylphosphine oxide, <\/a><\/p>\n

and trioctylphosphine oxide<\/a><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

APPLICATION OVERVIEW<\/strong><\/p>\n

Other documents are supplied with the Solvay application. Click to view.<\/p>\n

A site location plan<\/p>\n

HS_040-SITE_LOCATION_PLAN-960498<\/a><\/p>\n

A substance location plan for Hydrogen peroxide and cyanex.\u00a0NB THESE SUBSTANCES ARE TO BE STORED ACROSS THE WHOLE SOLVAY SITE AS EVIDENCED BY THE<\/strong>\u00a0PLAN<\/strong>\u00a0S2\u00a0AND<\/strong>\u00a0S3<\/strong><\/p>\n

HS_040-SUBSTANCE_LOCATION_PLAN_S2___S3-960496<\/a><\/p>\n

Locations for phosphine and Hexene are shown on the following plan.<\/p>\n

HS_040-SUBSTANCE_LOCATION_PLAN-960497<\/a><\/p>\n

There are other extracts of Solvay\u2019s COMAH report which are very interesting which appear to date from 2016.<\/p>\n

HS_040-COMAH_SAFETY_REPORT-960503<\/a><\/p>\n

This gives a breakdown of where employees at the factory (stated to be around 150), are typically located in each of the plants across the site.\u00a0A handy plan is located at the end of this part of the report.<\/strong><\/p>\n

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HS_040-RISK_ASSESSMENT-960504<\/a><\/p>\n

This plan gives a handy radius of the \u201cblast site\u201d and occupancy of residential properties and amenities within it. It is interesting to note that this stretches to a circumference of\u00a01.8 km\u00a0from the epicentre of the factory and includes\u00a010 schools.\u00a0.<\/p>\n

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HS_040-SAFETY_REPORT_-_EMERGENCY_RESPONSE-960512<\/a><\/p>\n

There is little but very basic information here about a range of scenarios.<\/p>\n

In 2009 of course it all went horribly wrong with the uncontrolled off site release of phosphine.<\/p>\n

This is what the HSE found in their report.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

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They could not even get the basic fire fighting methods correct.<\/strong><\/p>\n

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THEY FAILED TO SOUND THE TOXIC GAS ALARM\u00a0TO WARN THE LOCAL RESIDENTS THAT THERE WAS A LEAK.<\/strong><\/p>\n

In addition, they<\/p>\n