

POST INCIDENT REPORT

January 2013

Crosswells Road/Alcohols Ltd Fire

26th November – 3rd December 2012



Prepared by:
Alan Boyd
Resilience Manager
January 2013



INTRODUCTION

This report is compiled from the debrief interviews undertaken with staff who were heavily involved in the response and comments from those supporting the wider operation.

Sandwell Council acknowledges the hard work that went into the response on the day as well as the recovery operation and return to normality that followed. However, as with every incident, areas for improvement have been identified and these will form an action plan for the relevant managers and services to address.

Once the recommendations and actions have been approved by the Chief Executive; the Director of Street Scene, Steve Handley, will receive a periodic progress report by the Resilience Unit.

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1. AIM OF THE REPORT

As part of Sandwell Council's Emergency Management Policy a post incident review is carried out after every significant event involving the council. This report is designed to capture all of the learning points, to ensure that if a similar incident occurs in the future the council will be able to demonstrate, through an improved response, that lessons have been learned. In keeping with the expectations of Government and the requirements of the Council under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 the lessons learned report will include recommendations which, if approved, form the basis of an action plan.

2. INCIDENT DATE

26th November – 3rd December 2012.

3. BACKGROUND INFORMATION

At approximately 0955 hrs on the 26th November 2012, a fire started at the Alcohols Ltd distillery on Crosswells Road during a chemical decantation process. The fire quickly escalated and West Midlands Fire Service attendance was requested via 999 calls from numerous sources. At its peak there were more than a hundred Fire Service personnel and 24 vehicle assets deployed at the scene. Emergency road closures were put in place to ensure unhindered access for emergency services vehicles.

Due to the extent of the fire and the risk from chemicals stored at the Alcohols site, a cordon was established 100m from the building. This included part of the Snow Hill to Stourbridge rail line which was closed. Several hundred properties were within the cordoned area and some residents were unable to return to their homes that evening.

As a consequence of the fire, the electricity supply to surrounding properties failed and remained off until it was safe for the repair crews to gain access to remedy the situation.

Low grade asbestos was released during the fire onto the immediate area and it took several days to clear up. A small group of residents were unable to return to their homes for up to 7 days after the incident.

4. LESSONS LEARNED & RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 Procedures

- 4.1.1 The initial notification of the incident was received by Robert Sunley in the Resilience Unit by colleagues within minutes of the explosion occurring. Sandwell Council staff had observed the scene from their office window. The Resilience Unit immediately called Fire Control for an initial assessment of the situation.
- 4.1.2 The council's duty Forward Liaison Officer (FLO) was immediately sent to the scene before an official request was made from the emergency services. It was clear from what was observed and from reports from the emergency services that this was a major incident and that a request for a council liaison officer would be made. This turned out to be correct and therefore onsite liaison was established very quickly and effectively. The FLO was well briefed by the Fire Service on arrival and then on an hourly basis.
- 4.1.3 The duty Rest Centre Liaison Officer was alerted on the assumption that an evacuation was likely and he immediately started to assess which local rest centre options were available in readiness for a request to evacuate residents. The British Red Cross who manage Sandwell's Rest Centres were activated by the Resilience Unit, however it is considered that this should have been done earlier in the incident to ensure a more timely arrival at the Rest Centre. The registration process also needs to include the details required by Sandwell Homes for emergency accommodation.

Action – Resilience Manager to ensure that procedures include the early alert / activation of the British Red Cross and that their registration procedures take in to account the needs of Sandwell Homes emergency accommodation information.

- 4.1.4 Once roles and responsibilities were established at the scene of the fire, the information flow became timely and accurate. The FLO kept the council's Resilience Officer updated and passed on any requests for council support. The information received ensured that regular Situation Reports (SITREPs) were produced and circulated to The Chief Executive, The Leader, Ward Members (12 councillors due to the location of the fire being at the intersection of 4 wards) and key council staff and partners. Not all members of the Management Board were included in the circulation of the SITREPs even though most Directorates were affected in some way. Receiving such reports assists them in their Duty Director role from an awareness perspective.

Action – Resilience Manager to ensure that SITREPs are forwarded to all members of the council's Management Board.

- 4.1.5 The Duty Transport Officer was put on standby by the council's Resilience Officer and when activated provided three buses, each with a driver and escort.
- 4.1.6 The decision regarding the selection of the Rest Centre facility was taken quickly by the West Midlands Police at the scene. This was following an offer from the Head Teacher of Moat Farm Junior School. The use of educational establishments for such a purpose is normally undesirable particularly when the school is in operation due to security reasons and limited facilities. The duty Rest Centre Liaison Officer was concerned at the use of the site however decided that it was easier to remain at that location than to disrupt and move the evacuees. However alternative locations were identified should the evacuation extend for a longer period or more people arrive. Liaison between the Rest Centre Liaison Officer and the Resilience Unit was good. The response of the school was considered to have been 'fantastic' by council officers responding to the incident.

Action – Resilience Manager to review Rest Centre facilities in the borough with a view to increasing the number.

- 4.1.7 Unfortunately during the time the evacuees attended the rest centre some damage to chairs occurred caused by some residents. The cost of the damage has been met by the council. Around 170 evacuees were registered in the rest centre.
- 4.1.8 Liaison between the Resilience Unit and Sandwell Homes was initially poor due to the lack of understanding of each other's roles and response practises. However a mutual understanding of roles and responsibilities was quickly gained and communication flowed effectively. Sandwell Homes has a highly effective procedure for alerting officers to emergency situations as displayed during this incident when CCTV, Community Alarm, Caretakers etc. all alerted Sandwell Homes management to the incident within minutes.

Action – Resilience Manager to incorporate Sandwell Homes' response procedures in to those of the council's.

- 4.1.9 The procedure for emergency road closures was speedy and effective both during and outside of office hours. By 5pm on the first day all road closures were in place. The deployment of barriers was highly efficient. Daily checks followed to ensure that the barriers were in position and secure. Maps of the road closures were produced speedily and circulated. Had the police requested the barriers earlier it would have reduced the need for so many Police Officers at each road block. Operational staff focussed their normal activity in the area for several days to ensure speedy support should there have been an issue with the barriers at the scene.
- 4.1.10 There is no formal contract with a traffic management contractor for barriers during an emergency response. It is believed that there is an emergency storage facility ('Disaster Shed') in the borough containing barriers and other

equipment for emergency traffic management issues; however there is a lack of knowledge as to the location and there is no inventory.

Action – Resilience Manager to liaise with Martin Brayford concerning the Disaster Shed.

4.1.11 On the second day of the incident the Duty Transport Officer was alerted that he may be called again that day. He did not receive a subsequent call (or stood down). Unknown to the Resilience Unit the Duty Transport Officer had put staff on standby and were sitting around waiting. The Senior Driver credited those he put on standby with two hours TOIL.

Action – The Resilience Manager to ensure that when officers are given a ‘Head’s up’ that those contacted are aware that the call is for information only and not a formal standby.

4.1.12 The Duty Transport Officer relies on colleagues in the service to respond when a request for the transportation of evacuees is received. A list of volunteers and drivers telephone numbers is retained at work for ‘data protection’ reasons. This means that the Duty Transport Officer has to go into work to call out the drivers and escorts. However he also requires a key holder contractor to attend the office to open up. This means that there will be a significant delay following the request from the emergency services to transport evacuees out of office hours.

Action – The Resilience Manager to liaise with local taxi companies to provide a speedier response capability particularly for vulnerable residents in the borough

4.1.13 Sandwell Homes staff, who arranged the overnight accommodation for evacuees were unaware of the presence or availability of the council’s transport. Consequently they arranged for taxi’s to take some of the residents to the Ramada Hotel. This meant that the council transport was idle and more cost was incurred. One resident paid their own taxi fare. Although the Transport Officers wear high visibility vests they do not have corporate branding / logos on them. Neither do the vehicles. This presents a safety and security dilemma for evacuees who are not aware who the drivers and escorts and vehicles are. The lack of corporate branding on clothing and vehicles has the potential to give the perception to evacuees that Sandwell Council is not present nor supporting them. The Duty Transport Officer will always assume that 3 vehicles will be needed and therefore call out 6 members of staff which may on occasion be excessive and unnecessary.

Action – The Transport Manager to ensure that all council drivers and escorts are wearing Sandwell Council logoed attire and response vehicles similarly.

Action – The Resilience Manager to meet with the Duty Transport Officers to clarify procedures and the expectations of the role.

- 4.1.14 Confusion arose when some residents were advised that they could return to their property by one emergency service only to be refused so by another. This was due to the Police and Fire working to different cordons – the ‘zero point’ i.e. the centre point of the cordon - being used by both responders was different. This was rectified however after inconvenience to the evacuees.
- 4.1.15 The police response under the direction of Sgt Neadle was perceived to have been key to the success of the initial Police response. He had in-depth local knowledge and respect.
- 4.1.16 The cordon that was set up to prevent residents from walking through areas contaminated by low grade asbestos was not adequately maintained by the Police Community Support Officers (PCSO) left to guard it. One PCSO allowed residents through. This was reported back to the Resilience Officer who quickly spoke to the Duty Inspector and the cordon was reinstated.
- 4.1.17 Sgt Neadle is reported to have been very sensitive to residents needs for medication and allowed them to return to their home briefly whereas other officers (presumably following instructions) refused with the reported threat of arrest if they did.

Action - The Resilience Manager to raise points 4.1.14 to 4.1.17 at the multi-agency debrief.

- 4.1.18 As a response to the power outage the Chief Executive requested for an additional rest centre to be opened (the Windmill Centre) for those affected. There were 60-70 homes affected not the 300-400 reported. However no one attended. It is considered that this was due to those affected being reluctant to leave their property. Overnight accommodation is never offered to those affected by power cuts unless they are particularly vulnerable which Sandwell Homes have plans for. The power loss resulting from the fire happened at the same time as another power outage nearby which caused some confusion however this was quickly clarified. The Western Power Electricity Distribution Company provided their own humanitarian support for those affected by power loss – usually a Red Cross vehicle distributing hot drinks.
- 4.1.19 The basic principle of an integrated emergency response is that people ‘do their day jobs in extraordinary circumstances’. There were a plethora of issues such as pollution, community safety / recovery and protection of the vulnerable that did not receive the attention from council officers whose day-job it was. Responding council officers felt that a handful of officers responsible for these issues as part of their normal day jobs were reluctant to deal with them until asked. The Forward Liaison Officers felt that there should have been a point when the tasks were handed over to those responsible for the issues.

However some services responded in a highly professional manner during the incident, for example Building Control and the Wardens were diverted to give residents a uniformed presence and feeling of security. Sandwell Homes’

emergency accommodation plans cover the full range of the evacuees needs and were, for example, able to cope with a large family of 10 adults and 14 children in this incident. The Sandwell Homes officers displayed a very high level of consideration towards the evacuees regardless of the status of their house – tenant or owner,. 40 families had to be accommodated in some way.

4.1.20 Trident Homes were also very active in the locality during the incident however had limited engagement with the Resilience Unit.

Action – Resilience Manager to ensure that emergency contact numbers exist for all social housing organisations in the borough.

4.1.21 The duty Building Surveyor was activated by West Midlands Fire Control and largely operated outside the corporate response. During the initial stages of the response there was no communication between the Duty Officer and the Resilience Unit activity.

Action – The Resilience Manager to arrange a briefing session for all of the Building Surveyor staff.

4.2 Communication

4.2.1 The production and distribution of Situation Reports (SITREPs) started 30 minutes after the incident began. The reports were welcomed and considered to be informative, accurate and timely. As the incident progressed the distribution increased. During future incidents, SITREPs will have a wider distribution to reflect a now greater understanding of roles and responsibilities. The SITREPs were shown to Public Relations prior to sending due to a recipient forwarding the SITREPs direct to the press.

Action – The Resilience Manager to ensure future SITREPs are distributed adequately.

4.2.2 The incident took place at the intersection between 4 electoral wards. This meant that 12 Elected Members were alerted to the incident and received the SITREPs which was well received.

4.2.3 Sandwell Homes and council telephone help lines were established and information notes prepared for the call handlers. Residents were advised of the numbers through leaflets, word of mouth and via the media. The issues identified with establishing the helpline were –

4.2.3.1 Some confusion with the Police giving out telephone numbers without understanding the purpose of the lines;

4.2.3.2 Sandwell Homes dedicated helpline was very useful but became overwhelmed as residents were using it for all enquiries;

- 4.2.3.3 Sandwell Homes was provided with an insurance statement from the council Insurance Services Manager; to help contact centres with enquiries.
- 4.2.3.4 The number given out for insurance queries was being abused and the contact centre couldn't cope with the volume of calls;
- 4.2.3.5 Attempts to pass information to the council Contact Centre at Wellman was difficult due to both managers being on leave at the same time and their phones not being answered.

Action – The Resilience Manager to review the arrangements for Helplines

- 4.2.4 Only those responding officers with Blackberry's could read the SITREPs.
- 4.2.5 Once the SITREPs were received by a Sandwell Homes officer they began to be circulated internally. This did not extend to Trident Homes however, where no communication was being shared, it was done so unintentionally.
- 4.2.6 A local resident obtained the mobile phone number of a Duty Officer which they then used extensively.
- 4.2.7 Clarity is needed when discussing numbers of people affected. For example 6 properties were being confused with 6 residents.
- 4.2.8 Mobile phone batteries became flat as the incident progressed.

Action – the Resilience Manager to investigate additional battery charging capability.

- 4.2.9 The Forward Liaison Officer spoke regularly to Cllr Wilkinson on site who lives opposite the factory but isn't the local ward member. Cllr Wilkinson has raised the possibility of developing the 'Community Ambassadors' concept into being a potential resource during such an emergency.

Action – The Resilience Manager to consider the suggestion with colleagues in order to build Community Resilience.

- 4.2.10 Communication within the police between those at the briefing and officers on the front line seemed chaotic with mixed messages and Chinese whispers. There was limited information conveyed between officers at shift change.

Action – The Resilience Manager to raise Police Communications at the multi-agency debrief.

4.3 Liaison between Functions/Organisations

- 4.3.1 Once established the liaison between Sandwell Resilience Unit and Sandwell Homes was good and it is considered that Sandwell Homes and Trident Homes worked well together. Attendance at the multi-agency debriefs on site was also good however there was no electricity company liaison officer on site, only a repair team who were not expecting to be liaison officers.

Action – The Resilience Manager to liaise with the Electricity Distribution Company to clarify procedures.

- 4.3.2 Sandwell Council Revenues and Benefits Service provided valuable support with regard to identifying those residents missing from any register to enable a check to be carried out to ensure their safety.
- 4.3.3 The duty Building Control Surveyor found it difficult to identify council officers on site due to the lack of corporate branding on high visibility jackets and hats. Not all staff have been issued with logoed corporate clothing.

Action – The Resilience Manager to raise with Directors for future clothing orders.

- 4.3.4 A call to the police when residents began to ignore the cordon was quickly addressed by Police Sgt Neadle who rectified the situation and the integrity of the cordon
- 4.3.5 Liaison with Public Health took place concerning possible responses to the public if any enquiries were received relating to the low grade asbestos. The advice was to go to their GP, NHS direct or walk in centre.
- 4.3.6 A refuse (bin) collection was attempted each day however access was not allowed, replacement bins were offered to those properties with damaged bins.
- 4.3.7 The police were very complimentary about the Highways Teams who attended the sites quickly and provided valuable support.
- 4.3.8 The Environment Agency was alerted to the incident due to any potential impact (pollution) on the river Tame.

4.4 Safety, Health & Wellbeing

- 4.4.1 This was the Forward Liaison Officer's first incident response in this new role. It is acknowledged that the officer, Nick Garratt, did a remarkable job. However he did a 12 hour stint (1000hrs to 2145hrs) which is generally regarded as unacceptable. It is the responsibility of the Duty Resilience Officer to monitor the welfare and lone worker status of duty officers and if necessary seek a colleague to take over the role during prolonged incidents.

There are currently 5 FLOs on the roster and this incident has demonstrated that this number is inadequate.

Action – The Resilience Manager to recruit an additional three duty officers to join the roster.

- 4.4.2 At one stage the Forward Liaison Officer stopped residents going through an asbestos strewn road. This was communicated to the Resilience Officer who alerted the police and a senior officer returned to the site.
- 4.4.3 The Forward Liaison Officer used the special needs library service at Crosswells road for toilets and refreshments, they were very helpful. Another FLO was provided with refreshments by the Ambulance Service Welfare Unit.

4.5 Public Relations

- 4.5.1 There was good liaison with The Leader, the Resilience Unit, Press Office and West Midlands Fire Service Press Officers prior to a radio interview.
- 4.5.2 Low level asbestos caused concern with residents and reassurance was sought from a credible source which was provided via the HSE. They used local media to inform the residents.
- 4.5.3 A Press Officer was requested to attend the scene at various stages to help with the media interest.
- 4.5.4 The duty Rest Centre Liaison Officer found the frequent calls from the Press Officer distracting and may have been better done through the Resilience Officer who knew most of the information being sought.

Action – The Resilience Manager to review the Communications Procedure.

- 4.5.5 One elected member attended the scene, Cllr Davies and was briefed. There is a perceived missed opportunity to communicate with residents via the elected members who may be unaware of multi-agency response arrangements.

Action – The Resilience Manager to run more Emergency Management workshops for Elected Members.

- 4.5.6 In the main the Media were dealt with by West Midlands Fire Service and it is considered that this was very effective. A request to the FLO for an interview was declined by the officer.
- 4.5.7 The support provided by the council Press Team was considered to be very good and the Social Media aspects were kept up to date through receipt of the SITREPs and road closure information.

- 4.5.8 The Ramada Hotel which looked after the evacuees did so very well. The tenants provided very good feedback on their treatment at a tenant's conference.
- 4.5.9 Public Relations were unaware that the railway line had been shut. A search of the London Midland website confirmed that it had. This was found out by accident and the information re-tweeted.
- 4.5.10 Information requests from Radio WM were addressed speedily and accurately.
- 4.5.11 Reporters were being advised that they could go into the rest centre by Public Relations. However, this is not normal procedure and not acceptable to the Police, Rest Centre Manager and the residents themselves without prior consultation and management of the visit. The unannounced arrival of a reporter, who did not identify themselves to reception and started to wander around the Rest Centre (which was also a school in operation), was escorted by the police officer to a room for interview. They left shortly afterwards.

Action – The Resilience Manager to ensure that the Press Team can not make such a decision in isolation.

- 4.5.12 The Press Team consider that the good and timely updates provided by the Resilience Team were key to the success of the media response. It was a positive and effective way of working and enabled the wider public to be informed of the disruption.
- 4.5.13 It was identified that the SITREPs being forwarded to the press by one of the recipients was occurring without approval. This had the potential to compromise the level of detail that could be provided.
- 4.5.14 The factory affected by the fire appeared to be expecting continued support from the council's media team.
- 4.5.15 Local residents affected by the road closures were becoming hostile due to the impact being caused. This was both local businessmen and residents. Duty Officers on site had to appease them and could appreciate the level of frustration they were experiencing.
- 4.5.16 A Sandwell Homes officer was working full time on communicating with evacuees whilst they were in the hotel.
- 4.5.17 It is considered that the Company Director of the factory was very good with the local residents and displayed a genuine concern for residents. He was proactive and went to school and addressed some local residents.

4.6 Incident Management

- 4.6.1 Generally the standard of log keeping by the Resilience Unit and Duty Officers was poor, most of the issues raised at the debriefs were recollected rather than formally recorded.

Action – The Resilience Manager to re-emphasise the need for the recording of information throughout the incident to assist in the post incident review and any public inquiry.

- 4.6.2 The Resilience Team received good support from operational colleagues and Steve Handley which assisted greatly, particularly with local knowledge. The Resilience Officer felt in control and valued the back-up and support of others.

- 4.6.3 Some contact numbers were out of date and need to be checked and updated on a regular basis.

Action – The Resilience Manager to ensure the periodic review of contact numbers including those held in Community Alarm and CCTV.

- 4.6.4 This was the first incident where the new incident management procedures were activated. The Forward Liaison Officers felt that there was an improvement on previous incidents with a clear command and control system in place. The single point of contact worked well.

- 4.6.5 Incident management at the scene was greatly enhanced by the timely and informative hourly briefings by West Midlands Fire Service. However when they left the scene there was an information vacuum, police did not maintain the briefing sessions as they should. Additionally the police appeared unaware that it was their responsibility to maintain the integrity of the cordon.

Action – The Resilience Manager to raise lack of briefing sessions and awareness of responsibilities at the multi-agency debrief.

- 4.6.6 The Sandwell Homes incident management team relocated to the CCTV Control Room which proved to be an ideal location where they were able to watch the incident.

- 4.6.7 The SITREPs were comprehensive, relevant and were always available. The number of SITREPs issued throughout the duration of the week-long incident was 38 and the distribution list increased as the incident progressed. The incident started at approximately 0955hrs and the first SITREP was issued at 1024hrs. Updates started half-hourly and then hourly. As the recovery phase progressed updates were then sent every couple of hours and subsequently twice a day. The final SITREP was sent on Monday 10th December at 09.47 declaring the emergency response and recovery phase was at an end.

Action – The Resilience Manager to review the distribution lists in light of restructures and other organisational changes.

- 4.6.8 As part of the incident management process there needs to be a formal (and not an assumed) point when matters relating to the incident become normal business activity. It was commented that services wanted/needed to be told to be proactive as to when they take up ownership of their issues.

Action – The Resilience Manager to detail transition point between an incident and normal business in briefing sessions.

- 4.6.9 The handover between duty Forward Liaison Officers were good and introductions were made to the key players by the outgoing FLO.
- 4.6.10 It is considered by officers at the scene that aspects of the traffic management system introduced was done so remotely and consequently over-engineered. Some of the decisions lacked an appreciation of the consequences. Some decisions aggravated the situation where attempts were being made to appease residents and businesses. Maps can be deceptive in terms of scale and impact.

Action – The Resilience Manager to discuss with Traffic Management.

4.7 Finance

- 4.7.1 At the time of producing this report the total costs to the council for the response and recovery had not been calculated. Due to budget pressures Sandwell Homes has already contacted the Factory Owner direct to seek payment for the emergency accommodation (£3,780) and for the transport costs (taxis £145.20). It is expected that council services will have costs associated with the response.
- 4.7.2 See Appendix 1 for traffic management costs incurred.

Action – The Resilience Manager to consolidate the costs associated with the councils response and invoice Alcohols Ltd. As staff time is more difficult to quantify it is suggested that this aspect remains unclaimed.

3. CONCLUSION

The response to this incident was a true team effort at all levels within the council, with stakeholders and professional partners. The incident demonstrated the need for, and value of, good communication to be established quickly and to continue for the duration of the incident including the recovery phase.

Some relationships were formed during the incident that could have perhaps been made prior to the incident. However, there was praise for the incident response phase. In particular the following people should be commended for their efforts namely:

- Robert Sunley – Resilience Officer,
- Nick Garrett – Forward Liaison Officer,
- Russell Allen – Rest Centre Liaison Officer,
- Alan Muddiman – Highways,
- Timmie Chandar – Building Surveyor
- George Fewtrel – Building Surveyor

Sandwell Homes colleagues for the emergency accommodation effort,

- Julie Hickman,
- Michelle Fletcher,
- Norman Fletcher,
- Steve Greenhouse,
- Chris Lewis,
- Andrew Langford and
- Mark Peniket.

The inevitable lessons learned will assist Sandwell Council in moving forward and build on the existing strength of relationships, procedures and practises.

January 2013.

6. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author of the report is grateful to those who participated in the debrief:

Name	Service
Robert Sunley	Resilience Unit
David Aston	Resilience Unit
Russell Allen	Rest Centre Officer
Nick Garratt	Forward Liaison Officer
Geoff Deakin	Forward Liaison Officer
Terry Evans	Forward Liaison Officer
Steve Handley	Director of Street Scene
Julie Hickman	Sandwell Homes
Michelle Fletcher	Sandwell Homes
Steve Greenhouse	Sandwell Homes
Chris Lewis	Sandwell Homes
Norman Fletcher	Sandwell Homes
Andrew Langford	Sandwell Homes
Mark Peniket	Sandwell Homes
Chris Horst	Communications
Darren Beck	Communications
Kerry Brelsforth	Highways
Irfan Choudry	Highways
Alan Muddiman	Highways
Kennedy Brown	Transport Officer
Timmie Chandar	Building Control Officer
George Fewtrell	Building Control Officer

7. SUMMARY OF ACTIONS

REPORT REF.	RESPONSIBLE OFFICER(S)	TARGET DATE	COMMENTS	COMPLETION
4.1.3	Alan Boyd	June 13		
4.1.4	Alan Boyd	June 13		
4.1.6	Alan Boyd	June 13		
4.1.8	Alan Boyd	June 13		
4.1.9	Alan Boyd	June 13		
4.1.10	Alan Boyd	June 13		
4.1.11	Alan Boyd	June 13		
4.1.12	Alan Boyd	June 13		
4.1.13	Alan Boyd	June 13		
4.1.17	Alan Boyd	June 13		
4.1.20	Alan Boyd	June 13		
4.1.21	Alan Boyd	June 13		
4.2.1	Alan Boyd	June 13		
4.2.3	Alan Boyd	June 13		
4.2.8	Alan Boyd	June 13		
4.2.9	Alan Boyd	June 13		
4.2.10	Alan Boyd	June 13		
4.3.3	Alan Boyd	June 13		
4.4.1	Alan Boyd	June 13		
4.5.4	Alan Boyd	June 13		
4.5.5	Alan Boyd	June 13		
4.5.11	Alan Boyd	June 13		
4.6.1	Alan Boyd	June 13		
4.6.3	Alan Boyd	June 13		
4.6.5	Alan Boyd	June 13		
4.6.7	Alan Boyd	June 13		
4.6.8	Alan Boyd	June 13		
4.6.10	Alan Boyd	June 13		
4.7.2	Alan Boyd	June 13		

For further clarification on the Summary of Actions or for more information, please contact Alan Boyd, Resilience Manager.

Actions are to be completed by the responsible officer by the target date. The Resilience Manager will produce a progress report for the Chief Executive at the end of March 2013.

8. **APPENDIX 1**

Alcohols Ltd Factory Fire (Crosswells Road)
Traffic Management & SMBC Legal Costs

Date	TM Company	Comments	Purchase Order No	Amount
26/11/12 – 03/12/12	Currall. Lewis & Martin	Emergency TM following request from Police		£2150.35
03/12/12 – 16/12/12	Traffix	Hire, Installation & daily maintenance of more permanent TM	651539	£497.00
04/12/12	Traffix	Provision of additional Signage	651733	£109.00
17/12 12 – 07/01/13	Traffix	Hire of equipment & daily maintenance charge for dates specified.	654656	£885.00
02/01/13 – 07/01/13	Traffix	Hire of equipment & daily maintenance charge for dates specified.	655772	£553.00
03/12/12 – 23/12/12	Sandwell MBC	Emergency Road Closure - Notice		£850.00
24/12/12 – 13/01/13	Sandwell MBC	Follow Up Closure by Notice		£850.00
14/01/13 - tbc	Sandwell MBC	Temporary Traffic Regulation Order for long term road closure		£1,700.00

Total (Exc VAT): **£7,594.35**